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Abstract 
 
The nature of reality has been a central concern of philosophy and the social sciences, but since 
the proliferation of social media, psychological operations have taken on greater visibility and 
significance in political action. ‘Fake news’ and micro-targeted and deceptive advertising in 
elections and votes has brought the tenuous character of political reality to the fore. The 
affordances of the Internet, World Wide Web and social media have enabled users to be 
mobilised to varying degrees of awareness for propaganda and disinformation campaigns 
both as producers and spreaders of content and as generators of data for profiling and 
targeting. This article will argue that social media platforms and the broader political economy 
of the Internet create the possibilities for online interactions and targeting which enable form 
of political intervention focused on the destabilisation of perceptions of reality and recruit users 
in the construction of new politically useful realities. 
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 Introduction 
It is not new for political actors to trick, cajole or confuse populations in attempts to 
produce political outcomes or for leaders to use propaganda as part of their military 
arse- nal. However, since the proliferation of social media, ‘psychological operations’ 
have taken on greater visibility and significance in political action (Briant, 2018; Singer 
and Brooking, 2018). The lying and denunciation of critics as ‘fake news’ by US President 
Donald Trump and the micro-targeted and deceptive social media advertising in the 
2016 US presidential election and United Kingdom’s EU referendum brought the 
tenuous character of political reality to the fore (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Marwick 
and Lewis, 2017). Valuable work has conceptualised the still emerging political conse- 
quences of ‘big data’ and targeted advertising enabled by online platforms. However, this 
has focused on political consequences of micro-targeting individuals based on psycho- 
graphic profiles and related power asymmetries involved (Tufekci, 2014) and the ‘modu- 
lating controls’ enabled by the categorisation of users based on inferred characteristics 
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011). What has so far been under-emphasised is the ways in which 
users are mobilised to varying degrees of awareness. Propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns require direct employment of workers to produce and disseminate content, 
which has always been the case, but the strategies prominent today also depend upon 
mobilisation of different categories of users and audiences (many unwittingly) both as 
producers and spreaders of content and as generators of data for profiling and 
targeting. This article will argue that social media platforms and the broader political 
economy of the Internet create the possibilities for online interactions and targeting 
which enable a form of political intervention focused on the destabilisation of 
perceptions of reality and recruit users in the construction of new politically useful 
realities. The following sections will introduce the theoretical approach taken to 
propaganda, reality construction and sociality online in this article. Subsequently, a new 
way of analysing online propaganda activities will be introduced through the concept 
of ‘reflexive control’ (borrowed from a form of Russian statecraft) which is achieved 
through the mobilisation of three kinds of ‘agents of influence’. This analysis will then 
be explained through its application to sev- eral relevant cases taken from recent online 
propaganda strategies. The implications of this analysis for how we understand the 
relationship between everyday Internet users and their role in the functioning of 
political power and the construction of social reality will be suggested in the conclusion. 
 
Propaganda 
While propaganda was initially used to neutrally describe information dissemination, it 
has increasingly taken on a pejorative meaning associated with manipulation and disinfor- 
mation (Welch, 2014: 4–5). Official and governmental definitions tend to position it as an 
activity of an adversary whereas one’s own agencies conduct persuasion (Kuehl, 2014: 
12). To achieve desired responses, the propagandist tends to present information in two 
ways; by controlling the media as a source of information and presenting information 
which appears to be from a credible source (Jowett and O’Donnell, 1999: 42). The former 
might traditionally be achieved through the direct state control of media or through 
using legal or other measures to pressure independent outlets to transmit a particular 
message or censor their output. The latter would tend to work either through 
establishing a trusted source of information in a foreign territory which both provides 
 useful information for local populations and propaganda (e.g. Voice of America, BBC 
World Service, RT) or by secretly embedding journalists in the employ of the propagandist 
to spread their message. Some have suggested it is more helpful to consider that 
propaganda (unlike persuasion) tends to appeal less to the rational will instead seeking 
to bypass the autonomous decision- making process of the target (Stanley, 2015: 62). The 
distinction made by Stanley is some- what stark but does highlight an often posed 
distinction between an ideal of an autonomous decision-maker and one whose decision-
making capacities have been manipulated or impaired. Rather, I position propaganda, at 
least for the purposes of this article, as deliber- ate attempts to manipulate a target’s 
ability to process and ‘filter’ information. Crucially, this does not position those who are 
successfully targeted by propagandists as more ‘emo- tional’ or ‘reactive’ (indeed 
examples are presented below when ‘rational’ argumentation is used for propaganda) 
than other populations, rather, I focus on those who are attempting to disturb the 
filtering process. We will see that the digital economy of the Internet itself is predicated 
on the disturbance of such filters. 
Propaganda strategies are always shaped by their media environment which can be 
understood in terms of the connectivity enabling information exchange, the content and 
the cognitive impact of using the content all of which have been transformed by the 
Internet and connected devices (Kuehl, 2014: 17). This new ‘network propaganda’ has 
the same intentions as older forms (manipulation for political ends) but uses aspects of 
the online ecosystem which make it more susceptible to the dissemination of misleading 
messages (Benkler et al., 2018: 24). A growing body of work has investigated the work- 
ings of this new ‘computational propaganda’ (Woolley and Howard, 2016) through stud- 
ies of ‘trolling’ (Marwick and Lewis, 2017; Sest and March, 2017), automated social 
media accounts (‘bots’) (Murthy et al., 2016; Shao et al., 2018) and ‘fake news’ or ‘dis- 
information’ (Bosco, 2018; Briant, 2018). This literature demonstrates the change in 
strategies which have been enabled by digital technologies and networks such as ‘hijack- 
ing’ mainstream news media with extremist and conspiratorial content (Coleman, 2014; 
Marwick and Lewis, 2017), using ‘bots’ to shift political discourse (Shao et al., 2018; 
Singer and Brooking, 2018), micro-targeting individuals through social media advertis- 
ing and exploiting ‘filter bubbles’ (Bosco, 2018; Silverman and Alexander, 2016). 
Although these studies clearly identify the novelty of the methods used in digital 
propaganda, their analysis is broadly consistent with the 20th-century ‘broadcast’ model 
and does not properly take account of the extent to which ‘targets’ are actively engaged 
in practices of manipulation. The cases presented below are, of course, not entirely with- 
out precedent as ordinary members of the public have often been used to spread propa- 
gandistic messages in a manner similar to those described in the section, ‘Locally 
recruited agents of influence’ below. For instance, the US government’s ‘Four Minute 
Men’ were recruited during WWI to give short speeches mostly at cinemas (while the 
reels were being changed), promoting the war effort with centrally directed messages 
targeted at particular communities through using locals with whom they could identify 
(Auberbach, 2017; DeBauche, 1997: 80–84). Although there is some consistency with 
such examples of ‘peer persuasion’, the technical affordances of online networks pro- 
duce systems which are to some extent self-organising, enabling forms of ‘citizen 
engagement’ which are aligned with ‘official’ messages but not bound by traditional 
centralised organisational logics (Penney, 2017: 403; Stromer-Galley, 2014: 12). 
However, I will suggest that these logics are open to manipulation through the structur- 
 ing of encounters which enable imitative behaviours and thus for flows of ideas to be 
‘steered’. The contemporary saturated media environment requires individuals to 
‘filter’ information themselves and be actively involved in assessing the veracity of 
content and it is increasingly at this juncture where propaganda intervenes. The 
objectives of propa- ganda are no longer strictly to manipulate but to ‘[reorient] a 
targeted individual or state to self-select or privilege certain information’ (Fitzgerald and 
Brantly, 2017: 235). Furthermore, audiences, and paid operatives, are mobilised to 
spread messages them- selves. I will outline my theoretical approach to these 
developments through engagement with existing literature on the role of digital media 
in the social construction of reality and its potential for ‘steering’ beliefs and behaviours 
in the following two sections. 
 
Reality construction 
Analytical approaches to the social construction of reality have a long and storied history 
(see Burr, 2003: 10–15), but the seminal The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1971) with its emphasis on the role of communication, everyday action and 
practice is especially useful as a foundation for understanding what Couldry and Hepp 
(2017) call ‘The Mediated Construction of Reality’. They assert that while communica- 
tive technologies (from writing, through the telephone to WhatsApp) have always 
impacted on how we communicate, the extent of integration of digital media into our 
lives today has led to an unprecedented state of ‘deep mediatization’. Changes to the 
‘media ensemble’ have transformed the fundamental dynamics of social figurations and 
therefore the ways in which meaning is produced (Couldry and Hepp, 2017: 77). This is 
neither relativist nor consistent with the post-truth claims or the politicisation of scien- 
tific knowledge in contemporary populist rhetoric, rather, it is an acknowledgement 
that ‘truths’ are the product of discursive practices and material relations of power and 
politi- cal economy (Angermuller, 2018; Sismondo, 2018). 
The integration of social media content into everyday interactions (Couldry and 
Mejias, 2018; Couldry and Van Dijck, 2015) and mainstream media (Lăzăroiu, 2014) has 
accelerated the flow between what Adoni and Mane (1984) call ‘objective’, ‘symbolic’ 
and ‘subjective’ social reality. For example, an individual can present their interpretation 
of events (‘subjective reality’) on social media (whether honestly expressed or not) 
which can serve as content for mainstream media outlets which then forms part of the 
‘symbolic reality’ which is assumed by others to bear at least some relation to the ‘objec- 
tive reality’ (of actually existing social facts). Indeed, social media content can shape 
‘objective reality’ by becoming part of the cultural and political discussion and thus 
necessitate reactions from political figures thereby lending it political weight (regardless 
of its veracity). The distance between ‘objective reality’ and ‘subjective reality’ is further 
collapsed when the processes by which the former is constructed is obscured as is com- 
mon in the online world (Bilić, 2015: 1272). 
The perception of ‘objective reality’ is coloured by media institutions which construct 
what Couldry (2003) calls the ‘myth of the mediated centre’ or the assumption that there 
is a central understanding of the perception of social reality around which we can coa- 
lesce. But claims to such centrality have been undermined by the Internet to be 
replaced by a proliferation of different ‘centreings’ (Bilić, 2015; Hepp and Couldry, 
2010). Such ‘centreings’ have been widely discussed in the form of ‘filter bubbles’ 
(Bozdag and Van den Hoven, 2015; Davies, 2018; Pariser, 2011) but this existing work has 
 tended to focus on what is obscured by the filtering process and the political 
consequences but there are more ontological concerns relevant to this article. ‘Time’ 
(through shared histories and archives) and ‘space’ (through metaphors, virtual objects 
and the restrictions and poten- tialities programmed into interfaces) are central to the 
construction of the online aspects of social reality (Gotved, 2006). But these essential 
components of reality construction have become more controlled and centralised since 
‘platforms’ have come to dominate online interactions (Casilli and Posada, 2019; 
Gillespie, 2010; Srnicek, 2017). For instance, Facebook constructs ‘virtual realities’ 
through their ‘social graph’, which maps users’ interactions with one another and 
‘objects’ (pages, videos, groups) and enables them to produce ‘brand like assemblages’ 
which position users in relation to content  which does not necessarily bear any direct 
relationship to real-world lives and processes (Arvidsson, 2016: 9–12). 
In the following section, I will suggest that this process of mediated reality construc- 
tion occurs through fundamental components of sociality and that digital media provide 
new tools for observing and directing these everyday actions and interactions of users. 
This creates new opportunities for political actors to influence opinion. 
 
‘Steering’ online behaviour 
I argue for an approach to digital propaganda which takes account of the nuanced ways 
in which the actions and interactions of users and the ways in which these associations 
are mobilised for commercial purposes have become an integral part of propagandistic 
practices. For this, I turn to a sociology of the Internet informed by Gabriel Tarde’s soci- 
ology of imitation and innovation. This has been argued to be well suited to analysis of 
the Internet because it provides an understanding of the spread of ideas ‘as waves of 
imitative encounters [which] contain elements of mass conformity and imitation, while 
at the same time demonstrating elements of individual choice, innovation and creativity’ 
(Burgess et al., 2018: 1041). Such ‘waves’ are enabled through the formulation of ‘pub- 
lics’ which aid the transmission of beliefs and desires with the activities of audiences 
commercially valued due to their ability to produce ‘a temporary association of strangers 
held together by a common passion and [ . . . ] commitment to particular values’ 
(Arvidsson and Bonini, 2015: 167). The relational, Tardean approach to sociological 
analysis eschews any distinction between individual and society or agency and structure. 
Instead focusing on ‘monads’ which are temporary ‘wholes’ (or assemblages) made up 
of entities ‘lending’ some of their aspects. This is an ontology built on ‘having’ rather 
than ‘being’ in the sense that individual subjects can be broken down into certain charac- 
teristics (such as of gender identity) or beliefs which they ‘possess’ but also ‘possess 
them’ (De Freitas, 2016; Latour, 2007). 
In an era in which individual users of the Internet, and particularly social media, are 
defined by the ‘digital traces’ they leave behind, it is easier than ever to identify concrete 
manifestations of Tarde’s ontology. Through the lens of the network an individual social 
media user is defined by the list of attributes associated with them and by their 
connections to other entities (e.g. users, pages), but crucially the user and the network 
are formed of the same substance rather than the latter being another level added on 
top of the former (Latour et al., 2012: 592–3). This means that the focus must always 
remain on the level of the phenomena (ideas, beliefs, desires) which flow through 
networks rather than on the individuals or the seemingly solid social structures. 
Venturini (2019) has recently applied Tarde’s theory to the spreading of ‘fake news’ 
 (although he prefers the term ‘junk news’) online. He suggests that the innovation and 
imitation at the heart of Tardean sociality have been accelerated and trivialised by the 
technical affordances and political economy of a commercialised Internet built on 
advertising revenue (Venturini, 2019). However, Venturini opposes the reading of this 
phenomenon as a coordinated and sophisticated operation designed to manipulate 
audiences and it is here I depart from his analysis. While I agree that the events 
described in this article have been enabled by a multitude of developments often only 
loosely related (if at all), this does not mean that the present situation has been arrived 
at accidentally, nor does it mean that particular actors are not seeking to mobilise or 
direct aspects of the network for their own purposes. As Thrift (2010) has asserted, 
Tarde’s analysis also shows us how ‘imitative processes can be consciously and carefully 
steered’ (p. 260) by ‘aiding and abetting certain aspects of continual transformation, 
strategically bending processes so that it “ripens” in certain directions rather than 
others’ (p. 263). This analysis provides an ontological framework which can see the 
dense integration of human behaviour and consciousness with digital networks without 
positioning human actors as idealised, atomised, rational beings who are (or should) be 
resistant to attempts at external ideological influence or propagandists as all-powerful 
and all-seeing manipulators. 
The technical affordances of online networks with their capacity for ‘steering’ popula- 
tions have combined with the advertising-focused political economy of the Internet and 
social media to produce a particular relation to the mediated construction of reality 
described above. Below I will suggest how this situation has enabled a form of propa- 
ganda which focuses on manipulating a target’s selection and privileging of information 
to be applied to whole populations. 
 
Reflexive control and agents of influence 
It is my assertion that the theory of ‘reflexive control’ as a model of propaganda when 
combined with the theories outlined above can reveal important aspects of how propa- 
ganda functions today. Although this theory predates digital media, as it was originally 
used to describe strategies of ‘psychological operations’ developed in Russia during the 
Cold War, technological developments have enabled it to be mobilised against a much 
broader range of targets by non-state political actors and commercial enterprises. The 
‘reflexive control’ approach is a form of ‘non-linear warfare’ which is a ‘means of con- 
veying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline them to 
voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action’ 
(Thomas, 2004: 237). It is thus ‘a process by which one enemy transmits the reasons or 
bases for making decisions to another’ (Lepsky cited in Thomas, 2004: 238). While there 
are similarities with traditional forms of propaganda, ‘reflexive control’ is distinct as it 
seeks to affect the decision-making process of targeted individuals by manipulating their 
perception of reality. This approach requires the profiling of individuals to understand 
their moral and psychological dispositions by gathering data on their biography, habits 
and psychology (Thomas, 2004: 242). As Thomas (2004) summarises, 
By definition, reflexive control occurs when the controlling organ conveys (to the 
objective system) motives and reasons that cause it to reach the desired decision the 
nature of which is maintained in strict secrecy. The decision itself must be made 
independently. A ‘reflex’ itself involves the specific process of imitating the enemy’s 
 reasoning or imitating the enemy’s possible behavior and causes him [sic] to make a 
decision unfavorable to himself [sic]. (p. 241) 
 
Ultimately the ‘controller’ is trying to impose their will on the target not by telling 
them what to think but by influencing their decision-making practices and their percep- 
tions of reality. This is done by manipulating the ‘filter’ used by the target, this is used to 
refer to the collection of concepts, knowledge, ideas and experience through which 
they make decisions and distinctions between information which is useful/useless or 
true/ false (Thomas, 2004: 247). Traditionally ‘reflexive control’ was used against 
military and political leaders as they were deemed to be able to make strategic 
decisions of ben- efit to the controller. Moreover, it would have been impossible to 
target non-prominent figures or large groups because the strategy is dependent on 
detailed profiles of such figures which were difficult to compile. However, today such 
profiles are routinely pro- duced on all social media users enabling the reflexive control 
approach to be applied more widely. 
‘Reflexive control’ is one aspect of a broader strategy developed by the USSR in the 
1950s which sought to exercise overt and covert influence on events and behaviours in 
foreign countries and referred to as ‘active measures’. These were implemented by 
‘agents of influence’ who were divided into three types: ‘fully employed operatives’ 
infiltrating organisations and spreading messages, ‘locals’ recruited to the cause and 
‘unwitting accomplices’ unaware that they were the subject of control by a foreign agent 
(Cull et al., 2017: 3). Contemporary online propaganda functions through the mobilisa- 
tion of distributed users the actions of whom can be understood through all three 
catego- ries of ‘agents of influence’. The following section will outline how the first 
category of ‘fully employed operatives’ are engaged in constructing new realities or 
using disinfor- mation to obscure targets’ perception of reality. 
 
‘Fully employed “agents of influence”’ 
The first and most obvious way in which the principles of ‘reflexive control’ are applied 
to digital politics is using fully employed ‘agents of influence’ to plant disinformation, 
discredit alternative viewpoints or simply cause confusion. Perhaps the most well-known 
example is the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is a state-funded group 
that operates cyber attacks in Russian interests. They seek to manipulate social and politi- 
cal discourse (particularly in foreign territories) by posting messages favourable to the 
regime or to undermine oppositional messages or individuals. This is done both through 
personally creating accounts and posting messages under the guise of a fictional figure 
(‘sock puppets’) or using ‘botnets’ to amplify messages created by ‘sock puppets’ or ‘real’ 
accounts useful for their cause. In 2014, IRA employees were expected as a daily mini- 
mum to post comments on news articles 50 times, manage six Facebook accounts with 
at least three posts, hold two discussions in news groups and manage 10 Twitter 
accounts with 50 tweets per day (Singer and Brooking, 2018: 111–112). Such activities by 
Russian operatives formed part of the influence campaign conducted during the 2016 US 
presiden- tial election which was found by the US National Intelligence Council to have 
used, among other means, ‘paid social media users or “trolls”’ (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence Council, 2017: ii). A UK government report on the ‘[l]essons 
learned from the EU referendum’ of 2016 found similar tactics were used to ‘influence 
public opinion’ (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017: 35). 
 Comparable strategies have been used in China to suppress anti-state sentiment in their 
own popula- tion. Rather than the antagonistic approach of the IRA, the Chinese ‘50c 
Party’ (named for the erroneous observation that individuals are paid US50c per social 
media post) are civil servants seconded to spread positive messages through 
‘cheerleading’ messages aimed at drowning out discontent or criticisms of the state (King 
et al., 2017). In many cases, ‘fully employed’ agents use ‘bots’ to amplify messages on 
private networks (e.g. closed WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger groups) as well as 
openly on social media. This hap- pened when a 3500 strong ‘botnet’ was used to attack 
Marcelo Freixo (a candidate in the 2016 mayoral election in Rio de Janeiro) with the same 
messages being posted more than 100 times per hour (Arnaudo, 2017: 20). Despite the 
seeming success of ‘bots’ in amplify- ing the efforts of employed agents (for reports on 
their influence see, Arnaudo, 2017; Machado et al., 2018; Ruediger et al., 2018; Woolley 
and Howard, 2016) China, one of the most notorious and sophisticated users of 
propaganda techniques, largely eschews automation. Instead, when producing social 
media propaganda both for foreign (using Twitter) and domestic (using Weibo) 
audiences, they make use of their vast and cheap human resources to employ users to 
personally post to fake accounts in huge numbers with 6% of reposting on news stories 
and 30% of accounts considered ‘opinion leaders’ found to be fake (Bolsover and 
Howard, 2019: 4). 
Other countries have incorporated such activities into their military wings. In a 2012 
conflict, the Israeli Defence Force and Hamas conducted a social media battle alongside 
the use of physical force by circulating propaganda, highjacking popular hashtags and 
hacking commercial Facebook pages (Singer and Brooking, 2018: 193–194). In 2015, the 
British Army established the ‘77th Brigade’ which drew recruits from across all units of 
the army to engage in ‘unconventional warfare’ specifically targeting recruits with skills 
in social media and psychological operations (Allison, 2016; MacAskill, 2015) to use 
digital marketing strategies (Miller, 2018) and behavioural analysis to ‘adapt behav- 
iours of the opposing forces and adversaries’ (The British Army, 2017). The Israeli pri- 
vate intelligence firm ‘PSY Group’ is known to have pitched its services to the Trump 
campaign, a controversial religious sect in the Netherlands and the president of Gabon 
(Entous and Farrow, 2019; Mazzetti et al., 2018), market their services with the slogan 
‘Reality is a matter of perception’ (PSY Group, n.d.). They claim to be able to ‘Shape 
Reality’ (Entous and Farrow, 2019) through using ‘gathered intelligence and broad 
expertise to build highly effective, targeted, online and offline campaigns’ (PSY Group, 
n.d.). These examples represent cases where people have been directly employed by 
states or companies to produce content explicitly intended to manipulate public 
opinion through shaping targets’ perception of reality without them knowing. 
Moreover, this is done through engaging in specifically digital forms of intervention, 
that is, generating online content or creating networks and stimulating imitative sharing 
practices in others in a manner which is largely indistinguishable from that of genuine 
users. 
Locally recruited ‘agents of influence’ 
The second category of ‘agents of influence’ are ‘locally recruited’ although their inten- 
tions may not be directly aligned with those who benefit from their actions. First are 
those who are sympathetic to the ideology of a political group or actor but do not appear 
to have a direct connection to them. After Donald Trump’s election General Michael 
 Flynn (previously Trump’s national security adviser) praised the ‘army of digital sol- 
diers’ who he claimed helped win the White House through manipulating social media 
discourse (Singer and Brooking, 2018: 176). Discussion boards such as Reddit, 4Chan 
and 8Chan were their main tools as these are structured such that they encourage a 
cul- ture of inflammatory and extreme posting with posts ordered according to recency 
and engagement so often the only way to stay at or near the top (and therefore gain 
exposure) is to attract a high number of comments or ‘upvotes’ (Coleman, 2014: loc 
672). ‘Alt  right’ activists, often sympathetic to Trump, see their role as being to ‘wake 
up’ centrists, or liberal conservatives, to the realities of the oppression of middle-class 
White males by mainstream media and liberal democracy. They engage in sustained 
campaigns to recruit converts by using offensive humour and irony (often in memes) to 
blur the line between sincerity and parody and encouraging the imitation and repetition 
of posting and sharing practices they would otherwise consider to be distasteful, 
offensive or dangerous (Marwick and Lewis, 2017; Singer and Brooking, 2018). 
Some similar strategies are used by the Chinese ‘voluntary 50c army’ who seek to 
convert others to their pro-state ideology (but unlike those discussed above are not 
paid agents) through ridiculing and hooking opponents with fabricated anti-state 
stories in order to demonstrate their gullibility (Han, 2015). Similarly, committed actors 
were influential in Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign in Brazil through the 
mobilisation of closed WhatsApp groups the significance of which was acknowledged by 
his support- ers heard triumphantly chanting ‘WhatsApp’ after his victory (Belli, 2018; 
Doctorow, 2019). Volunteer group administrators would ban critics of the candidate or 
bombard anyone questioning his policies with fabricated stories and memes designed 
for virality usually produced by a dedicated group of ‘influencers’ (Nemer, 2018). 
WhatsApp groups supporting specific parties in the 2019 Indian General election are 
also considered to have been effective with analysis showing high levels of ‘junk news’ 
being circulated in easily shareable image formats (Narayanan et al., 2019). 
A second category of ‘recruited agents of influence’ are people whose online activities 
are clearly of benefit to some political groups or actors but appear to have no direct con- 
nection, or even in some cases ideological alignment, with them. Perhaps the paradigm 
case is the group of Macedonian teenagers who made millions of dollars producing ‘click 
bait’ websites for an American audience in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election 
(Tynan, 2016). They realised that there was an increasing appetite for outrageous and 
conspiratorial stories which were pro-Trump and anti-Clinton, so employed other teen- 
agers to generate new content for websites they owned. This was enabled by Facebook’s 
advertising system which could easily be ‘gamed’ to drive traffic if they used sufficiently 
enticing headlines and content (Singer and Brooking, 2018: 118–121). These young men 
had no political alignment with Trump but identified aspects of the social media econ- 
omy which could be exploited through the generation of ‘fake news’ and it just so 
happens that the demand among, and value of, Trump supporters was much higher 
than other groups (Smith and Banic, 2016). Similarly, one of the most prominent 
American purveyors of pro-Trump ‘fake news’ produces what they consider to be satire, 
and at one time generated around US$10,000 a month through Google ads but 
conceded they may have helped Trump win the 2016 election (Dewey, 2017). These 
entrepreneurs are exploiting the political economy of the advertising-funded Internet 
which places high value on sensationalist disinformation and the creation and sustaining 
of publics through the mobilisation of interpersonal passions (Arvidsson and Bonini, 
 2015: 168). 
 
Unwitting ‘agents of influence’ 
The spreading of ideas through social media networks is dependent on the activities of 
individual users unwittingly acting out the desires of political actors who use outrage to 
attempt to trigger responses which can be seen as bypassing autonomous decision- 
making (Stanley, 2015: 16) and constituting users as ‘automatic subjects’ (Till, 2019). 
But a Tardean sociology of the Internet shows how such imitative actions are fundamen- 
tal to the social thus suggestions that lack of education, critical thinking or resilience to 
influence are to blame for the spread of propagandistic messages are shown to be mis- 
guided. The targeting of social media users who are likely to act as effective ‘receptors’ 
and ‘spreaders’ to propagandistic messages has been enabled by the demographic data 
and psychographic profiles on Facebook and other social media sites generate. These 
profiles are constructed out of the everyday imitative and innovative behaviours of 
users with platforms directing their ‘passions’ through encouraging them to identify 
with particular brands, ideas, issues or public figures (Arvidsson, 2016; Arvidsson and 
Bonini, 2015). 
Guardian journalist Cadwalladr’s (2017) investigation into the use of Facebook data 
by the Leave campaign in the UK EU referendum found that 
 
Finding ‘persuadable’ voters is key for any campaign and with its treasure trove of data, 
Cambridge Analytica could target people high in neuroticism, for example, with 
images of immigrants ‘swamping’ the country. The key is finding emotional triggers 
for each individual voter. 
 
Once such profiles have been constructed, anyone who wants to influence users 
through advertising (whether this is to buy a product or to vote) can use tools such as 
Facebook’s ‘Lookalike Audiences’. This enables advertisers to 
 
choose a source audience (a Custom Audience created with your pixel data, your 
mobile app data or fans of your Page) and we identify the common qualities of the 
people in it (ex: demographic information or interests). Then we find people who are 
similar to (or ‘look like’) them. (Facebook Ads Help Center, n.d.) 
 
The digital media director for Trump’s 2016 election campaign credited the ‘Lookalike 
Audiences’ tool with a significant role in their win (Boghani, 2018). However, it is the 
extensive integration of Facebook with the advertising industry which has enabled this 
profiling to become powerful. Former Cambridge Analytica employee Christopher Wylie 
described how the company used ‘off-the-shelf’ cultural narratives constructed by the 
fashion, music and other industries to match up with Facebook data to determine which 
users would be receptive to pro-Trump messaging. They found that users positive 
towards ‘American heritage brands’ such as Wrangler were more likely to be receptive 
than those with a liking for Nike or Louis Vuitton (Kansara, 2018). Facebook thus provided 
a way to connect the aesthetic and emotional relationship people had to these brands 
with their ‘persuadability’ through analysing their engagement with the platform. It was 
precisely these emotional engagements with aspects of identity (as objectified in 
brands) which were considered the most effective ways of targeting those users most 
 susceptible to ‘mobilization’ by producing messaging which articulated threats to their 
identity in simi- lar ways as in online fan cultures (Arvidsson et al., 2016). Thus ‘patriotic’ 
Facebook  groups were created by the IRA to falsely claim the perpetrator in the shooting 
of a Boston police officer as a Clinton and Black Lives Matter supporter. Similarly, Russian 
opera- tives were found to have created Facebook groups and used targeted advertising 
to mobi- lise a pro-gun rally outside an Islamic centre in Houston, Texas, and the 
opposition to this rally (Nadler et al., 2018: 31–34). Facebook’s monetisation strategy is 
built on the exploi- tation of affective relations and social reproduction (Jarrett, 2016), 
enabling the activities associated with them to be used for propagandistic purposes. The 
same imitative online activities (‘liking’, ‘sharing’ or simply reading or watching) which 
enable profiles to be constructed and beliefs and desires to circulate generate data 
which are both of commer- cial value to brands and political value to propagandists. 
 
Conclusion 
It is the position of this article that political power today, when functioning through 
social media, is dependent on the imitative activities of large swathes of the population 
which are ‘steered’ through activating affective engagement. In some cases, people are 
paid to construct and maintain fake social media profiles working for military divisions 
such as the UK Army’s ‘77th Brigade’, government agencies such as the Russian IRA or 
civil servants in the ‘50c Party’ in China. Sometimes these activities are intimately con- 
nected with automated processes and the work of ‘bots’ and ‘botnets’. However, the 
majority are much more loosely (if at all) connected to state agencies. This can be seen 
with individuals (such as the Macedonian teenagers) identifying opportunities afforded 
by the economics of the web and producing ‘click-bait’ advertising beneficial to other 
political actors. Message board trolls, such as those on 4Chan, are similarly cognisant of 
the political economy of the Internet and social media and how this can be leveraged 
through strategic manipulation of virality for political rather than economic ends. But 
most of the reality construction can be seen in the everyday actions and interactions of 
people who are simply engaging in political and non-political discussion who neverthe- 
less help to spread messages and produce psychographic profiles beneficial for viral 
manipulation of discourse and targeted advertising. 
I suggest there are two elements of the above-described influence campaigns which 
make them distinctive to the digital era and have been enabled by the affordances of 
contemporary networked digital technologies. First, all the strategies mobilise the basic 
elements of sociality (as identified by Tarde) of imitation and invention and their role in 
enabling and directing flows of beliefs and desires. The propagation of the latter has been 
intensified by social media, and the Internet in general as have previous innovations in 
communication technologies (Barry and Thrift, 2007: 518). Furthermore, social media 
platforms have been especially effective in this due to the innovations which have ena- 
bled them to become so successful at profiling users, enabling their propensity to act as 
‘receptors’, and encouraging sharing behaviours thus shaping them into effective 
‘spreaders’ (Crockett, 2017; Thrift, 2010). The information and power asymmetries 
between platforms and users mean that indirect control (which does not appear like 
con- trol) can be produced (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016) in a manner similar to ‘reflexive 
con- trol’. The same network structures which enable the extraction of value produce 
the possibility for users to be mobilised for propagandistic purposes. 
Second, the kinds of influence which are being attempted can best be understood as 
 a form of ‘reflexive control’, that is, using profiles of targets to direct messages which will 
destabilise their ‘filter’ and therefore their ability to make judgements in their own inter- 
ests (Kasapoglu, 2015; Thomas, 2004). The strategies used by the nation states and polit- 
ical campaigns described above (directly or indirectly) attempted to destabilise truth 
claims and/or construct new micro-realities through targeted messaging (Cull et al., 
2017; Office of the Director of National Intelligence Council, 2017; Public Administration 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017). Although ‘reflexive control’ is a Russian- 
developed approach to statecraft, it is not my position that all these examples have 
been directly enabled or encouraged by the Russian state (although in some cases they 
may have been), rather that the Russian approach to political influence is becoming 
increas- ingly significant in global politics. Today the kind of detailed profiles which were 
previ- ously only obtainable through time-consuming and expensive research and 
spying can now be easily drawn off from social media profiles constructed from data 
freely given away by users. These profiles help to construct ‘brand like assemblages’ by 
enabling the positioning of users in relation to content (generated by themselves or 
others) and adver- tising based on analysis of their affective relationship (Arvidsson, 
2016: 12). It is these derived, ‘virtual realities’ which Cambridge Analytica found to be 
most valuable in their targeting for the US election (Ferrier, 2018; Information 
Commissioner’s Office, 2018). While Arvidsson (2016) questions whether Facebook’s 
‘virtual reality’ bears any direct connection to ‘reality’ (instead seeing it as analogous to 
financial derivatives), I suggest that data points which underpin it could only be 
constructed through enticing users into the spreading of messages and construction of 
useful profiles. So, while Facebook’s ‘social graph’ might be a ‘virtual reality’ it is one to 
which our lives are increasingly aligned thus making the interventions of political (or 
commercial) actors in online lives more powerful. Whether Internet users are ‘fully 
employed’ (e.g. ‘77th Brigade’), ‘locally recruited’ (e.g. 4Chan ‘trolls’) or ‘unwitting’ (e.g. 
retweeters of IRA posts) ‘agents of influence’, they are contributing towards the 
‘mediated construction of reality’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2017) by producing or spreading 
the materials with which we con- struct our understandings of the world. 
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